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Lightweight and Unobtrusive Privacy Preservation
for Remote Inference via Edge Data Obfuscation
Dixing Xu, Mengyao Zheng, Linshan Jiang, Chaojie Gu, Rui Tan, and Peng Cheng
Abstract—The growing momentum of instrumenting the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) with advanced machine learning tech-
niques such as deep neural networks (DNNs) faces two practical
challenges of limited compute power of edge devices and the
need of protecting the confidentiality of the DNNs. The remote
inference scheme that executes the DNNs on the server-class or
cloud backend can address the above two challenges. However,
it brings the concern of leaking the privacy of the IoT devices’
users to the curious backend since the user-generated/related
data is to be transmitted to the backend. This work develops
a lightweight and unobtrusive approach to obfuscate the data
before being transmitted to the backend for remote inference. In
this approach, the edge device only needs to execute a small-scale
neural network, incurring light compute overhead. Moreover, the
edge device does not need to inform the backend on whether
the data is obfuscated, making the protection unobtrusive. We
apply the approach to three case studies of free spoken digit
recognition, handwritten digit recognition, and American sign
language recognition. The evaluation results obtained from the
case studies show that our approach prevents the backend from
obtaining the raw forms of the inference data while maintaining
the DNN’s inference accuracy at the backend.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, edge computing, deep neural
networks, privacy, data obfuscation
I. INTRODUCTION
THE fast development of sensing and communication tech-nologies and the wide deployment of Internet-enabled
smart objects in the physical environments foster the forming
of the Internet of Things (IoT) as a main data generation
infrastructure in the world. The tremendous amount of IoT data
provides great opportunities for various applications powered
by advanced machine learning (ML) technologies.
IoT in nature is a distributed system consisting of nodes
equipped with sensing, computing, and communication capa-
bilities. In order to build scalable and efficient applications
on top of IoT, edge computing is a promising hierarchical
system paradigm. In edge computing, the widespread net-
work edge devices (e.g., home gateways, set-top boxes, and
personal smartphones) collect and process the data from the
end devices that are normally smart objects deeply embedded
in the physical environments (e.g., smart toothbrushes, smart
body scales, smart wearables, and various embedded sensors).
Then, the edge devices interact with the cloud backends of
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the applications to exchange processed data summaries and/or
commands. Thus, by deploying certain data processing tasks
on the Internet edge, the communication bandwidth usage can
be reduced and the scalability of the IoT applications can be
improved.
However, the implementation of the IoT edge that can
leverage the latest ML technologies faces two challenges:
• Separation of data sources and ML compute power: With
the advances of deep learning, the depth of inference
models and the needed compute power to support these
deep inference models increase drastically. Thus, the
execution of these deep inference models on the IoT end
or edge devices that have limited compute resources may
be infeasible or cause too long inference time. Moreover,
the execution of deep inference models on battery-based
edge devices (e.g., smartphones) may not be desirable
due to high power consumption. A remote server-class
or cloud backend with abundant ML compute power
including powerful hardware acceleration is still desired
for deep inference model execution.
• Confidentiality of inference models: A deployable infer-
ence model often requires significant efforts in model
training and manual tuning. Thus, an inference model in
general contains intellectual properties under the enter-
prise settings. Even when the edge devices can execute
the model and meet timing/energy constraints, deploying
the inference model to the edge devices in the wild may
lead to the risk of intellectual property infringement (e.g.,
extraction of the model from the edge device memory).
Moreover, the leak of the inference model can aggravate
the cybersecurity concern of adversarial examples [1].
Therefore, it is desirable to protect the confidentiality of
the deep inference models.
To address the above two issues, remote inference is a
natural solution, in which an edge device sends the inference
data to the backend, then the backend executes the inference
model and sends back the result. There are existing appli-
cations adopting remote inference. PictureThis [2], a mobile
App, captures a picture of plant using the smartphone’s camera
and then sends the picture to the cloud backend that runs an
inference model to identify the plant. Amazon Alexa, a voice
assistant, processes captured voices locally and also transmits
the voice recordings to the cloud backend for further analysis
and storage [3], [4]. However, remote inference inevitably
incurs privacy concerns, especially when the inference data
is collected in the user’s private space and time, such as voice
recordings in households [4]. The pictures for plant recognition
2may also be misused by the curious cloud backend to infer the
users’ locations based on the background of the pictures. In
particular, the lack of privacy protection in remote inference
may go against the recent legislation such as the General Data
Protection Regulation in European Union.
Therefore, privacy preservation mechanisms are needed for
remote inference. To this end, CryptoNets [5] has been pro-
posed to homomorphically encrypt the inference data, perform
inference based on the encrypted data, and generate encrypted
results. While CryptoNets provides a strong protection of
the confidentiality of the inference data, it incurs significant
compute overhead to the edge devices [6]. Specifically, the
homomorphic encryption of a 28× 28 grayscale image takes
about ten minutes on a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B single-
board computer that has a 900MHz quad-core ARM CPU.
Differently, in this paper, we aim to design a lightweight
data obfuscation approach suitable for resource-constrained
edge devices to protect inference data privacy in the remote
inference scheme. With the lightweight approach, the edge
device spends little time and energy to obfuscate the inference
data before transmitting to the backend. Moreover, we aim
to achieve another feature of unobtrusiveness, in that i) the
inference model at the backend admits both original and obfus-
cated inference data, and ii) the edge device does not need to
indicate whether obfuscation is applied. The unobtrusiveness
feature provides three advantages. First, the system is back-
compatible with old edge devices that cannot be upgraded to
perform the data obfuscation. Second, the edge device can
easily choose to opt into or out of data obfuscation given
its run-time computation and battery lifetime statuses. Third,
the exemption of obfuscation indication helps improve privacy
protection.
In this paper, we present ObfNet, an approach to realize
the lightweight and unobtrusive data obfuscation at the IoT
edge for remote inference. ObfNet is a small-scale neural
network that can run at resource-constrained edge devices and
introduces light compute overhead. ObfNet’s sophisticated,
many-to-one non-linear mapping from the input vector to the
output vector offers a form of data obfuscation that can well
protect the confidentiality of the raw forms of the input data.
To achieve unobtrusiveness, we design a training procedure
for ObfNet as follows. We assume that the backend has an
in-service deep inference model (referred to as InfNet). The
backend concatenates an untrained ObfNet with the InfNet
and then trains the concatenated model using the training
dataset that was used to train InfNet. During the training,
only the weights of ObfNet are updated by backpropagation
until convergence. The backend repeats the above procedure
to generate sets of distinct ObfNets and transmits a unique set
to each of the edge devices. Then, each edge device chooses
an ObfNet randomly and dynamically from the received set
and uses it for obfuscating the data for remote inference.
We evaluate the ObfNet approach by three case studies of
1) free spoken digit (FSD) recognition, 2) MNIST handwritten
digit recognition, and 3) American sign language (ASL) recog-
nition. The case studies show the effectiveness of ObfNet in
protecting the confidentiality of the raw forms of the inference
data while preserving the accuracy of the remote inference.
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Fig. 1. A taxonomy of privacy-preserving ML approaches.
Specifically, the obfuscated samples are unrecognizable audi-
torily by invited volunteers for FSD and visually for MNIST
and ASL, while the obfuscation causes inference accuracy
drops of generally within 1% from the original inference
accuracy of about 99%. We also benchmark the ObfNet
approach on a testbed consisting of i) a Coral development
board equipped with Google’s edge tensor processing unit
(TPU) that acts as an edge device and ii) an NVIDIA Jetson
AGX Xavier equipped with a Volta graphics processing unit
(GPU) that acts as the backend. Measurements on the testbed
show the effectiveness of ObfNet and the advantage of remote
inference in terms of processing times.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews related work. Section III states the problem
and overviews our approach. Section IV presents performance
evaluation via three case studies. Section V presents bench-
mark results on the testbed. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section provides a brief taxonomy of existing privacy-
preserving ML approaches that are categorized into privacy-
preserving training and privacy-preserving inference ap-
proaches, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The nodes in a privacy-
preserving ML system often have two roles of participant and
coordinator. In the context of this paper, an edge device is a
participant and the backend is the coordinator.
In a privacy-preserving training process orchestrated by
the coordinator, the participants collaboratively train a global
model from their disjoint training datasets while the privacy of
the training datasets is preserved. Distributed machine learning
(DML) [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] is a typical scheme of
this category, in which only model weights are exchanged
among the nodes. However, the local model training and the
iterative weight exchanges are compute- and communication-
intensive. If the training data samples are to be transmitted
to the coordinator, they can be obfuscated or encrypted for
data privacy protection. Obfuscation is often achieved via
additive perturbation and multiplicative projection. Additive
perturbation implemented via Laplacian [13], exponential [14],
and median [15] mechanisms can provide differential privacy
3[23]. Multiplicative projection [16], [6], [17] protects the con-
fidentiality of the raw forms of the original data. In [16], [6],
the participants use distinct secret projection matrices, where
the Euclidean distances among the projected data samples
are no longer preserved. This can degrade the performance
of distance-based ML algorithms. To address this issue, in
[16], the participants need to project a number of public data
vectors and return the results to the coordinator that will learn a
regress function to preserve Euclidean distances. In [6], deep
neural networks (DNNs) are used to learn the sophisticated
patterns of the projected data from multiple participants. ML
can be also performed based on homomorphically encrypted
data samples [24], [18], [19], [20]. However, homomorphic
encryption incurs high compute overhead (millions times
higher than multiplicative projection [6]) and data swelling.
In privacy-preserving remote inference, the participants
transmit unlabeled data samples to the coordinator for in-
ference, while the participants’ privacy in the inference data
should be preserved. The proposed ObfNet is a privacy-
preserving remote inference approach. We now review the
existing privacy-preserving remote inference approaches in-
cluding CryptoNets [5] and partitioned DNN approaches [21],
[22]. CryptoNets [5] adjusts the feed-forward neural network
trained with plaintext data such that it can be applied to
the homomorphically encrypted data to make encrypted infer-
ence. However, the high compute overhead of homomorphic
encryption renders CryptoNets unpractical for edge devices.
Moreover, the neural network of CrytoNets needs to use square
polynomials as the activation functions, which are rare for
existing neural networks that often adopt the sigmoid function
or rectified linear unit (ReLU).
In [21], [22], DNN partition approaches are proposed for
privacy-preserving remote inference. Specifically, a trained
DNN is split into two parts. The first part, which can be
considered a feature extractor, is executed by the participant,
while the second part (i.e., inference model) is executed by
the coordinator. For privacy protection, various alterations are
applied on the feature vector extracted by the participant,
which include dimension reduction and Siamese fine-tuning in
[21], and nullification and additive noisification for differential
privacy in [22]. The inference model is retrained using the
altered feature vectors of the training data samples. A major
limitation of the DNN partition approach [22] is that the
feature extractor needs to be unique. Thus, all participants
need to use the same feature extractor. This renders the system
vulnerable to the collusion between any single participant
and the curious coordinator, because the coordinator may
reconstruct other participants’ original inference data samples
once they obtain the feature vector alteration mechanism.
Moreover, the participants cannot choose to opt out of the
privacy protection, whereas our ObfNet approach allows the
participants to choose to opt in or out freely. The feature
extractor in [21] consists of 11 to 13 convolutional layers,
which incur considerable compute overhead to edge devices.
From the above review, the training data obfuscation imple-
mented via additive perturbation or multiplicative projection
is a lightweight privacy-preserving training approach that can
be suitable for resource-constrained IoT edge and even end
devices. In contrast, lightweight privacy-preserving inference
has received limited research. In particular, as IoT applications
may prefer to use pre-trained deep InfNets, the development
of a lightweight privacy-preserving inference approach that
can adopt pre-trained InfNets is meaningful. Moreover, it
is desirable if the approach introduces privacy preservation
unobtrusively such that no modifications are needed for legacy
edge devices and backend that were designed with no privacy
preservation considerations. To achieve these goals, in this
paper, we design and present ObfNet.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND APPROACH OVERVIEW
In this section, we state the privacy preservation problem in
remote inference systems (Section III-A) and then present the
overview of the proposed ObfNet approach (Section III-B).
A. Problem Statement
We consider a remote inference system that consists of
multiple resource-constrained edge devices and a resourceful
backend. The backend can be a server program in the cloud.
The edge devices send the inference data samples to the
backend for inference. The backend executes a pre-trained
inference neural network (InfNet) using the inference data
samples. If the edge devices require the inference results, the
backend sends the results to the edge devices. This remote
inference scheme is advantageous if the heavyweight InfNet
causes too long execution time or is not feasible on the
resource-constrained edge devices.
Remote inference leads to privacy concerns if the inference
data samples are privacy-sensitive. In particular, the inference
data samples may contain private information beyond the
inference application. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to
protect the confidentiality of the raw form of each inference
data sample. The data form confidentiality is an immediate
and basic privacy requirement in many applications. In the
experiments conducted in this paper (cf. Section IV), we use
the human’s ability to interpret the protected inference data
samples as a measure of privacy preservation. The inference
results generated by the backend may also contain information
about the corresponding edge devices. However, in this paper,
we do not consider the privacy contained in the inference
results, since the edge devices should have no expectation of
it if they are willing to join the remote inference system.
Remote inference has two major privacy threats:
• Honest-but-curious backend. The backend follows the
privacy preservation mechanism described in Sec-
tion III-B to honestly serve the edge devices. It does not
intend to tamper with any data exchanged with the edge
devices. However, the backend is curious about the edge
devices’ private information contained in the inference
data, since the backend may benefit from the private
information irrelevant to the objective of the inference
application. For example, the backend may misuse the
extracted private information for unauthorized purposes,
e.g., targeted advertisement and political advocacy [25].
• Potential collusion between edge devices and the back-
end. We assume that the edge devices are not trustworthy
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Fig. 2. ObfNet for remote inference. The edge device i desires privacy
protection and thus applies ObfNet to obfuscate inference data sample xi
to x′i. The edge device j does not desire privacy protection and thus directly
transmits the original inference data sample xj to the backend. The backend
feeds x′i and xj to the pre-trained inference model InfNet to generate the
results yi and yj .
in that they may collude with the backend in finding out
other edge devices’ privacy contained in the inference
data. The colluding participants are also honest, i.e.,
they will faithfully transmit their inference data with
or without obfuscation. We aim to maintain the privacy
protection for an edge device when any or all other edge
devices are colluding with the backend.
B. Approach Overview
To address the privacy threats discussed in Section III-A,
in this paper, we propose an obfuscation neural network
(ObfNet) approach to obfuscate the inference data sample
before being transmitted to the backend. In particular, the
design of ObfNet aims to provide two properties of light
weight and unobtrusiveness as discussed in Section I.
ObfNet is a small-scale neural network executed on the edge
device to obfuscate the inference data samples. In our proposed
approach, the backend generates multiple sets of ObfNets by
following an approach detailed in the next paragraph and then
transmits a unique set to each of the edge devices. An edge
device that wishes to obfuscate the inference data chooses one
ObfNet from the received set and feeds the inference data
to the chosen ObfNet. Then, the edge device transmits the
output of the ObfNet, i.e., the obfuscated inference data, to
the backend for inference. The old edge devices that cannot be
upgraded to perform the data obfuscation and the edge devices
that do not wish to obfuscate the inference data can transmit
the original inference data to the backend for inference. The
backend executes the InfNet using the received inference data
and sends back the inference result to the edge device. Existing
cryptographic approaches can be applied to i) protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the data exchanged between
the edge devices and the backend and ii) the authentication of
the edge devices and the backend. Fig. 2 illustrates the remote
inference system where each edge device can choose to opt
into or out of the ObfNet-based privacy preservation.
Now, we present the approach to generating the sets of
ObfNets at the backend. Note that the ObfNets in any set
are distinct and all sets are also distinct (i.e., any two sets do
not share an identical ObfNet). Fig. 3 illustrates the approach.
It has two steps as follows.
Training phase
Training data Output...
Layer Layer
weights weights
...
Layer Layer
weights weights
The backend
The backendThe edge device
Inference phase
Inference
data
...
Layer Layer
weights weights
Output...
Layer Layer
weights weights
Fixed
ObfNet InfNet
Fig. 3. The procedure to generate ObfNets.
• ObfNet design. The system designer designs a small-scale
and application-specific neural network architecture for
ObfNet. The input to ObfNet is the original inference
data sample. The output of ObfNet is the obfuscated
inference data sample. Note that there is no rule of
thumb to design ObfNet’s architecture; similar to the
design of DNNs for specific applications, the design of
ObfNet also follows a trial-and-error approach using the
validation results of the training process as the feedback
(the training of ObfNet will be presented shortly). The
designer should try to reduce the scale of ObfNet to
make it affordable to resource-constrained edge devices.
Moreover, the ObfNet design should meet the following
requirements. First, to be unobtrusive, the dimensions
of the input and output should be identical. Second,
ObfNet should adopt many-to-one non-linear mapping
activation functions (e.g., ReLU) to prevent the backend
from estimating the exact original inference data from the
obfuscated one.
• ObfNet training. First, the backend initializes the weights
of an ObfNet with random numbers. Then, the backend
concatenates the ObfNet with the InfNet, forming a
concatenated DNN, where the output of ObfNet is used as
the input to InfNet. The backend trains the concatenated
DNN using the training dataset that was previously used
to train InfNet. During the backpropagation stage of
each training epoch, the loss is backpropagated normally.
However, only the weights of ObfNet are updated, while
the weights of InfNet are fixed. When the training of
the concatenated DNN converges, the backend retrieves
the trained ObfNet from the concatenated DNN. By
repeating the above procedure, the backend generates
multiple distinct sets of distinct ObfNets. Note that due
to the randomization of ObfNet’s initial weights and the
randomization techniques (e.g., training data sampling)
during the training phase, the trained ObfNets are dis-
tinct. The backend can determine the cardinality of each
set according to the available storage volume of the
corresponding edge device that desires data obfuscation.
Finally, the backend transmits the set to the edge device.
We have a few remarks regarding the ObfNet approach.
First, since InfNet is not changed during the training of
ObfNet, the InfNet can classify both the original and the
5obfuscated inference data samples. The execution of InfNet
does not require any indication of whether the input inference
data sample is obfuscated. Thus, the unobtrusive requirement
is achieved. Second, as the edge devices use distinct ObfNets
during remote inference, the collusion between any/all other
edge devices with the backend (i.e., the colluding edge devices
let the backend know which ObfNets they use) will not
affect the non-colluding edge devices. Third, as the ObfNet
uses many-to-one non-linear activation functions, it is highly
difficult (virtually impossible) for the backend to estimate
the exact original inference data sample from the obfuscated
one. Moreover, as each non-colluding edge device selects an
ObfNet from its received set randomly and dynamically for
obfuscation, the difficulty for the backend’s inverse attempt is
strengthened due to the introduced uncertainty.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present the applications of ObfNet
to three case studies. For each case study, we present the
data preparation, architectures of the InfNet and the ObfNet,
evaluation concerning the impact of ObfNet on inference
accuracy, and assessment on the quality of obfuscation. The
InfNets and ObfNets are implemented using Python based on
the TensorFlow library [26].
A. Case Study 1: Free Spoken Digit (FSD) Recognition
Our first case study concerns human voice recognition.
Recently, voice recognition has been integrated into various
edge systems such as smartphones and voice assistants found
in households and cars. In many scenarios, voice recordings
are privacy sensitive. Thus, it is desirable to obfuscate the
voice data for privacy protection, while preserving the per-
formance of voice recognition. In this section, we apply the
ObfNet approach to FSD recognition, which can be viewed
as a minimal voice recognition task. Using this minimal task
as a case study brings the advantage of easy exposition of the
results and the associated insights.
1) Data preparation: We use the FSD dataset [27], [28]
that consists of 2,000 WAV recordings of spoken digits from
0 to 9 in English. We split the data as 80% for training,
10% for validation, and 10% for testing. We extract the mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [29] as the features to
represent a segment of audio signal. According to [29], MFCC
is empirically shown to well represent the pertinent aspects
of the short-term speech spectrum and form a particularly
compact representation compared with other features such
as linear frequency cepstrum coefficients (LPC), reflection
coefficients (RC), and cepstrum coefficients derived from the
linear prediction coefficients (LPCC). As the recordings are
of different lengths, we apply constant padding to unify the
number of MFCC feature vectors for each recording. As a
result, the extracted MFCC feature vectors over time for each
recording form a 20×45 2-dimensional image. Both the InfNet
and the ObfNet take a 20× 45 image as the input.
2) Architecture of InfNet: Multilayer perceptron (MLP) and
convolutional neural network (CNN) are two types of DNNs
widely adopted for speech recognition and image classification
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Fig. 4. Structure of IC for FSD recognition.
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Fig. 5. Structure of IM for FSD recognition.
[30], [31], [32]. An MLP consists of multiple fully-connected
layers (or dense layers). Specifically, each neuron in any
hidden layer is connected to all the neurons in the previous
layer. CNN incorporates the features of shared weights, local
receptive fields, and spatial subsampling to ensure shift in-
variance [31], [33]. In this case study, we design MLP-based
InfNet and CNN-based InfNet, which are denoted by IM and
IC , respectively. Their details are as follows.
• IC consists of three convolutional layers, one max-
pooling layer, and three dense layers. Zero padding is
performed to the input image in the convolutional layers
and the max-pooling layer. ReLU activation is applied to
the output of every convolutional and dense layer except
for the last layer. ReLU rectifies a negative input to zero.
The last dense layer has 10 neurons with a softmax
activation function corresponding to the 10 classes of
FSD. Three dropout layers with dropout rate 0.25, 0.1
and 0.25 are applied after the max-pooling layer and in
the first two dense layers. Specifically, 25%, 10%, and
25% of the neurons will be abandoned randomly from the
neural network during the training process. Dropout is an
approach to regularization in neural networks which helps
reduce interdependent learning amongst the neurons. It is
widely leveraged during model training to avoid overfit-
ting [34]. Fig. 4 shows the structure of IC . The IC has
about 1.1 million parameters in total.
• IM has five dense layers. ReLU activation is applied to
the output of every hidden layer. The last dense layer
has 10 neurons with a softmax activation function. To
prevent overfitting, four dropout layers are applied after
the hidden layers. Fig. 5 shows the structure of IM . The
IM has about one million parameters in total.
3) Architecture of ObfNet: Similar to InfNets, we design
CNN-based and MLP-based ObfNets, which are denoted by
OC and OM , respectively. Their details are as follows.
• OC consists of two convolutional layers, one max-pooling
layer and one dense layer as the output layer. The first
convolutional layer filters the 20 × 45 input image with
three output filters of kernel size 2 × 4. The second
6convolutional layer applies five output filters with kernel
size 3 × 6. All convolutional filters use a stride of one
pixel. Batch normalization follows both convolutional
layers, which is expected to mitigate the problem of
internal covariate shift to improve model performance.
A max-pooling layer with pool size of 2 × 2 and stride
of two is then used to reduce the data dimensionality for
computational efficiency. Zero padding is added in each
convolutional layer and the max-pooling layer, to ensure
that the filtered image has the same dimension as the input
image in each layer. The dense layer with 900 neurons
is then connected after flattening the output of the max-
pooling layer. ReLU activation is applied to the output
of every convolutional and dense layer. This introduces
many-to-one mapping that is needed in our scheme as
discussed in Section III-B. Two dropout layers of with
dropout rates of 0.25 and 0.15 are applied respectively
after the max-pooling layer and in the dense layer. In
order to ensure that the output of ObfNet has the same
size as the input, a reshape layer is applied in the end
to reshape the output size to 20× 45. The OC has about
0.65 million parameters.
• OM has two dense layers as hidden layers. The first layer
has 200 neurons and is fully connected to the second layer
of 900 neurons. ReLU activation and batch normalization
are applied to the output of both layers. A reshape layer is
used as the output layer. The OM has about 0.37 million
parameters.
4) Inference accuracy of InfNet and ObfNet-InfNet: Fol-
lowing the procedures described in Section III-B, we train
IC and IM using the training dataset and then train OC and
OM in the four concatenations of ObfNet and InfNet (i.e.,
OC -IC , OM -IC , OC -IM , OM -IM ). During the training phase,
we adopt the AdaDelta optimizer, which introduces minimal
computation overhead over stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
and adapts the learning rate dynamically [35]. Note that during
the training phase, only the model achieving the highest
validation accuracy is yielded as the training result.
The test accuracy of the trained InfNets IC and IM is
99.5%. Thus, the InfNets are well trained. The four ObfNet-
InfNet concatenations give distinct test accuracy. For each con-
catenation, we trained ten different ObfNets. Fig. 6 shows the
inference accuracy of applying ten different ObfNets before
the well-trained InfNet. The average test accuracy of applying
OC and OM before IC is 98.35% and 99.40%, respectively.
The average test accuracy of applying OC and OM before IM
is 98.55% and 99.10%, respectively. Compared with the test
accuracy of the IC and IM on the original data (i.e., 99.5%),
the test accuracy drops caused by the obfuscation are merely
1.15%, 0.10%, 0.95% and 0.40% for different combinations
of the ObfNet and the InfNet. Thus, the inference accuracy is
well preserved when ObfNet is employed.
5) Quality of obfuscation: To understand the quality of ob-
fuscation, we apply the MFCC inverse using a Python package
LibROSA [36] to convert the MFCC representations back to
WAV audio. The audio converted from the original MFCC
representations can be easily recognized by human despite
some distortions. We also design an experiment to investigate
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Fig. 6. Test accuracy of different ObfNet-InfNet concatenations in ten tests.
whether humans can interpret the audios inverted from the
outputs of ObfNet, i.e., the obfuscated MFCC representations.
The details and results of the experiment are as follows.
We invited ten student volunteers (five males and five fe-
males) aged from 21 to 23 from Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool Uni-
versity. All volunteers have good hearing. In the experiment,
we randomly selected ten original MFCC representations from
the test dataset (one for each class of the FSD dataset). Then,
we applied the MFCC inverse using LibROSA to convert the
ten MFCC representations back to audio. The four different
ObfNets (two OCs and two OM s) used in our evaluation were
applied to obfuscate the two selected MFCC representations.
The obfuscated MFCC representations were inverted using
LibROSA to audios. Therefore, in total, there were 50 audio
files: ten for the original MFCC representations and 40 for
the obfuscated MFCC representations. All volunteers sat in
a classroom. The 10 audio files inverted from the original
MFCC representations were firstly played in the classroom
in a shuffled order. All volunteers can correctly recognize the
FSDs. Then, the 40 audio files inverted from the obfuscated
MFCC representations were played in a shuffled order. Every
volunteer was required to write down the FSD label (from 0
to 9) that they perceived.
Fig. 7 shows the confusion matrix for the ten volunteers to
recognize the audios inverted from the MFCC representations
obfuscated by ObfNet OC that is trained for InfNet IC . Each
row shows the distribution of the ten volunteers’ answers for
an audio with a certain true label. The last column shows the
accuracy for the audio. From the figure, we can see that the
volunteers’ answers are distributed over all labels without any
consensus. This suggests that the volunteers cannot perceive
useful information from the audio in recognizing the FSD.
The confusion matrices for the other three ObfNets can be
found in Appendix A. The overall accuracy, which is defined
as the number of correct answers divided by a total of 100
answers (10 volunteers × 10 audios), is 5%, 7%, 7%, 4% for
the four ObfNets, respectively. Thus, the volunteers’ answers
seem to be random guesses with an expected accuracy of
10%. Therefore, the ObfNets achieve satisfactory obfuscation
quality. Interested reader can download the obfuscated audio
samples from an online repository [37] and then examine them.
B. Case Study 2: Handwritten Digit (MNIST) Recognition
The MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [38] has been
widely adopted in ML literature. In this section, we apply
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Fig. 7. Confusion matrix for recognizing the audio inverted from the MFCC
representations obfuscated by ObfNet OC that is trained for InfNet IC . The
matrix omits the zeros.
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Fig. 8. Structure of IC for MNIST recognition.
our ObfNet approach to MNIST. Due to the simplicity of the
image samples in MNIST, the quality of the obfuscation can
be readily assessed by visual inspection.
1) Data preparation: The MNIST dataset consists of
70,000 handwritten digit images with ten classes correspond-
ing to the digits from 0 to 9, as shown in Fig. 11(a). Each
image has a single channel (i.e., grayscale image). We resize
each image to 28× 28.
2) Architecture of InfNet: We adopt two InfNets: a CNN-
based IC and an MLP-based IM . Their details are as follows.
• IC is similar to LeNet [38]. It consists of five layers: two
convolutional layers, a pooling layer, and two dense lay-
ers with ReLU activation. Fig. 8 shows the architecture.
The IC has about 1.2 million parameters in total.
• IM has four dense layers as illustrated in Fig. 9. It has
about 0.93 million parameters in total.
3) Architecture of ObfNet: An MLP-based ObfNet OM and
a CNN-based ObfNet OC are adopted. Details are as follows.
• OM has two dense layers with ReLU activation. This two-
layer design helps reduce the scale of ObfNet. Specifi-
cally, to be unobtrusive, ObfNet’s output must have the
same size as its input. For input size of 28× 28 = 784, a
single-layer MLP with bias has 784×784+784 = 615440
parameters. In contrast, a two-layer MLP with 16 neurons
within each layer has 784× 16+16+ 16× 784+ 784 =
25888 parameters only, which is 23.8 times smaller
than the single-layer MLP. We configure the number of
neurons for the first hidden layer to be 8, 16, 32, 64,
or 128. We will investigate the impact of ObfNet’s scale
on the accuracy of InfNet. The amounts of parameters
corresponding to the above configurations are from 0.013
to 0.804 million.
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Fig. 9. Structure of IM for MNIST recognition.
• OC has a convolutional layer, a pooling layer, a dropout
layer, and two dense layers with ReLU activation. The
convolutional layer filters the 28 × 28 input image with
32 output filters of kernel size 3×3 and uses stride of one
pixel. The max-pooling layer with pool size of 2× 2 and
stride of two follows to reduce spatial dimensions. Two
dense layers are then connected with ReLU activation.
4) Inference accuracy of InfNet and ObfNet-InfNet: The
test accuracies of the trained InfNets IC and IM are 99.35%
and 98.47%, respectively. This suggests that the InfNets are
well trained. As discussed in Section IV-B3, we vary the
number of neurons of the first hidden layer of the ObfNets
and train the ObfNets following the procedure presented in
Section III-B. Fig. 10 shows the test accuracy of various
concatenations of ObfNets and InfNets when the number
of neurons in the first hidden layer of the ObfNet varies.
From Fig. 10(a), compared with the test accuracy of IC , the
concatenation OM -IC has test accuracy drops ranging from
0.46% to 1.43% over various neuron number settings. When
the InfNet IM is adopted, more neurons in the first hidden
layer of ObfNet result in higher test accuracy of the ObfNet-
InfNet concatenation, as shown in Fig. 10(b). In particular,
some ObfNet-InfNet concatenations even outperform the cor-
responding InfNet. This is possible because the ObfNet-InfNet
concatenations are deeper neural networks compared with the
corresponding InfNet.
5) Quality of obfuscation: Fig. 11 shows the obfuscation
results of OM when the number of neurons in the first
hidden layer varies. From the figure, we cannot interpret
the obfuscation results into any digits. When the number of
neurons is few (e.g., 8 to 32), the obfuscation results of the
digit one are darker than the obfuscation results of other digits.
This is because the values of the pixels in the original inference
data of digit one are zero, leading to lower pixel values in the
obfuscation results. However, when more neurons are used in
the first hidden layer of OM , the overall darkness levels of
the obfuscation results of all digits are equalized, suggesting
a better obfuscation quality. The obfuscation results of OC
are given in Appendix B. Similarly, we cannot interpret the
obfuscation results into any digits.
C. Case Study 3: American Sign Language (ASL) Recognition
In this case study, we consider an application of ASL
recognition using camera-captured pictures. ASL is a set of
29 hand gestures corresponding to 26 English letters and three
other special characters representing the meanings of deletion,
nothing, and space delimiter. While ASL is a predominant sign
language of the deaf communities in the U.S., it is also widely
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(a) Test accuracy of InfNet IC and two ObfNet-InfNet concatenations
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(b) Test accuracy of InfNet IM and two ObfNet-InfNet concatenations
Fig. 10. Test accuracy of InfNets and ObfNet-InfNet concatenations for
MNIST recognition.
(a) Original inference data
(b) Obfuscation results of OM with 8 neurons in the first hidden layer
(c) Obfuscation results of OM with 16 neurons in the first hidden layer
(d) Obfuscation results of OM with 32 neurons in the first hidden layer
(e) Obfuscation results of OM with 64 neurons in the first hidden layer
(f) Obfuscation results of OM with 128 neurons in the first hidden layer
(g) Obfuscation results of OM with 256 neurons in the first hidden layer
(h) Obfuscation results of OM with 512 neurons in the first hidden layer
Fig. 11. Obfuscation results of ObfNet OM on MNIST.
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Fig. 12. Structure of IC for ASL dataset.
learned as a second language, serving as a lingua franca.
Therefore, portable ASL recognition systems [39] are useful
to the communications between ASL users and those who do
not understand ASL. Porting the ASL recognition capability
to smart glasses is desirable but also challenging due to smart
glasses’ limited compute power. Thus, remote inference is a
solution for smart glass-based ASL recognition. As the hand
gesture images caused by the embedded cameras can contain
privacy-sensitive information (e.g., skin color, skin texture,
gender, tattoo, location of the shot inferred from the picture
background, etc), it is desirable to obfuscate the images. Thus,
we apply ObfNet to ASL recognition.
1) Data preparation: We use an ASL dataset [40] consist-
ing of 87,000 static hand gesture RGB images with each sized
200× 200 pixels. Fig. 14(a) shows the samples corresponding
to the 29 classes of the ASL alphabet. To reduce the scale of
ObfNet, we down-sample the ASL images to 64× 64.
2) Architecture of InfNet: As ASL hand gestures have more
complex patterns than the MNIST handwritten digits, we adopt
a CNN-based InfNet IC Note that compared with MLP, CNN
often better deals with multi-dimensional spatial data. The
IC consists of three convolutional layers with 32, 64, 128
channels, a max-pooling layer, and three dense layers. We
adopt adopt after the pooling layer and the second dense layer
with drop rates of 0.25 and 0.5. Fig. 12 shows the architecture
of IC . The IC has about 111 million parameters in total.
3) Architecture of ObfNet: We evaluate both the MLP-
based ObfNet OM and the CNN-based ObfNet OC :
• OM has two dense layers with ReLU activation. We vary
the number of neurons in the first dense layer and evaluate
how it affects the inference accuracy. OM has about 6.3
to 25.2 million parameters, depending on the number of
neurons in the first dense layer.
• OC consists of a convolutional layer, a pooling layer,
two dense layers with ReLU activation. The convolutional
layer filters the 64 × 64 × 3 input image (i.e., 64 × 64
RGB image) with 32 output filters of kernel size 3×3 and
uses stride of one pixel. A max-pooling layer with pool
size of 2 × 2 and stride of two pixels follows to reduce
spatial dimensions. Two dense layers are then connected
with ReLU activation. Two dropout layers with dropout
rates of 0.25 and 0.4 are applied after the max-pooling
layer and the second dense layer to prevent overfitting.
OC has about 22 to 44 million parameters, depending on
the number of neurons in the first dense layer.
4) Inference accuracy of InfNet and ObfNet-InfNet: The
test accuracy of the trained IC is 99.82%. This suggests that
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Fig. 13. Test accuracy of InfNet and ObfNet-InfNet concatenations for ASL
recognition.
the InfNet is well trained. Multiple ObfNets are trained by
following the procedure presented in Section III-B.
Fig. 13 shows the test accuracy of various concatenations of
ObfNets and InfNets when the number of neurons in the first
hidden layer of the ObfNet varies. From Fig. 13, compared
with the test accuracy of IC , the concatenation OM -IC has
test accuracy drops ranging from 0.12% to 2.81% over various
neuron number settings. When the ObfNet OC is adopted, the
concatenation OC -IC has test accuracy drops ranging from
1.52% to 2.35%. When the number of neurons in the first
hidden layer increases from 512 to 1024, the test accuracy of
the OM -IC drops. This can be caused by overfitting, because
compared with the large number of OM ’s parameters, the
number of training samples is not large. Nevertheless, with
proper configuration of the ObfNet, the smallest test accuracy
drop we can achieve is 0.12%. This shows that the ObfNet
introduces little test accuracy drop for ASL recognition.
5) Quality of obfuscation: Fig. 14 shows the visual effect
of the obfuscation on the ASL samples. From Fig. 14(b) and
Fig. 14(c), we cannot interpret the obfuscation results of OM
and OC into any hand gestures. Note that the obfuscated
samples are still RGB images. Interestingly, the obfuscation
results by a certain ObfNet exhibit similar patterns. For
instance, each obfuscated sample in Fig. 14(b) has a dark hole
in the center and a greenish circular belt around the dark hole.
In fact, as the ObfNet has a large number of parameters (up
to tens of million), the pattern shown in the obfuscation result
is mainly determined by the ObfNet, whereas the original
inference data sample with a relatively limited amount of
information (64 × 64 × 3 = 12288 pixel values only) can
be viewed as a perturbation.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARK
This section presents the implementation of our ObfNet ap-
proach on edge/backend hardware platforms. The benchmark
results on the hardware platforms give understanding on the
feasibility of ObfNet in practice and interesting observations.
For conciseness of presentation, we only present the results of
OM trained for IC in the three case studies.
A. Hardware Platforms
Our implementation uses the Coral development board
[41] (referred to as Coral) and NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier
(a) Original inference data
(b) Obfusaction results of OM
(c) Obfusaction results of OC
Fig. 14. Obfuscation results of ObfNet on ASL.
[42] (referred to as Jetson) as the edge device and backend
hardware platforms, respectively. We implement the ObfNets
and InfNets of the three case study applications presented in
Section IV on Coral and Jetson, respectively.
Coral is a single-board computer equipped with an NXP
iMX8M system-on-chip and a Google Edge TPU [43]. Edge
TPU is an inference accelerator that cannot perform ML model
training. Coral sizes 8.8× 6 cm2 and weighs about 136 grams
including a thermal transfer plate and a heat dissipation fan.
The power consumption of Coral is no great than 8.5W.
Thus, Coral is a modern edge device platform with hardware-
accelerated inference capability. Note that owing to ObfNets’
small-scale design, they can also run on edge devices without
hardware acceleration for inference. Coral runs Mendel, a
lightweight GNU/Linux distribution. We deploy the ObfNet
implemented using the TensorFlow Lite library [44] on Coral.
Jetson is a computing board equipped with a 8-core ARM
CPU, 16GB LPDDR4x memory, and a 512-core Volta GPU.
The GPU can accelerate DNN training and inference. Jetson
sizes 10.5 × 10.5 cm2 and weighs 280 grams including a
thermal transfer plate. Jetson’s power rating can be configured
as 10W, 15W, and 30W. In our experiments, we configure it
to run at 30W to achieve the highest compute power. Jetson
can be employed as an embedded backend to serve edge
devices of applications in a locality such as an office building
and a factory floor. To support massive edge devices, a cloud
backend can be used instead. Jetson runs Ubuntu. We deploy
the InfNet implemented using TensorFlow [26] on Jetson.
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TABLE I
PER-SAMPLE EXECUTION TIME ON CORAL FOR OM TRAINED FOR IC .
Case study
ObfNet execution time (ms)
Minimum Average Maximum
FSD-OM 2.226 2.312 2.253
MNIST-OM 0.221 0.221 0.224
ASL-OM 11.136 11.146 11.170
TABLE II
PER-SAMPLE EXECUTION TIME ON JETSON FOR IC .
Case study
InfNet execution time (ms)
Minimum Average Maximum
FSD-IC 0.229 0.246 0.289
MNIST-IC 0.158 0.174 0.212
ASL-IC 0.201 0.219 0.249
B. Benchmark Results
For each case study application, we measure the per-sample
execution time for obfuscation on Coral and per-sample infer-
ence time on Jetson. To mitigate the uncertainties caused by
the operating systems’ scheduling, for each tested setting, we
run ObfNet or InfNet for 100 times.
1) ObfNet and InfNet execution times: Table I shows
Coral’s per-sample execution time for the ObfNets designed
for the three case studies. We can see that, the ObfNets need
little processing time (i.e., a few milliseconds) on Coral. Ta-
ble II shows Jetson’s per-sample execution time for the InfNets
designed for the three case studies. Although the InfNets have
larger scales than the ObfNets, the execution times of InfNets
are shorter than those of ObfNets due to Jetson’s greater com-
pute power. In TensorFlow, batch execution of inferences can
improve the efficiency of utilizing the hardware acceleration.
Thus, we also evaluate the impact of the batch size on the per-
sample execution time of InfNets. Fig. 15 shows the results.
We can see that the per-sample execution time decreases with
the batch size and converges. The convergence is caused by
the saturation of the hardware acceleration utilization. The
above results show that the ObfNets and InfNets introduce
little overhead to the edge device and the backend for the
considered case study applications.
2) Advantage of remote inference: Inference accelerators
such as Edge TPU may enable the execution of deep InfNets
on edge devices (i.e., local inference). In contrast, the remote
inference scheme considered in this paper involves the trans-
missions of the inference data to the backend, which may incur
time delays. In this set of benchmark experiments, we put
aside the need of protecting the confidentiality of InfNets as
discussed in Section I and compare the local inference and
remote inference in terms of total time delay.
TABLE III
PER-SAMPLE EXECUTION TIME OF IC ON CORAL.
Model
Inference time (ms)
Minimum Average Maximum
FSD-IC 13.484 14.318 15.137
MNIST-IC 7.606 8.351 9.095
ASL-IC 100.433 100.467 100.510
Table III shows the execution time of InfNets on Coral.
Compared with the results in Table II, for the FSD and
MNIST case study applications, the execution times on Coral
are about 50x longer than those on Jetson. For ASL, it is
about 480x longer. The data transmission delays under the
remote inference scheme are often small, because edge devices
often have wideband network connections (e.g., Wi-Fi and
4G). Based on the average inference data sample sizes of the
case study applications (i.e., 10KB, 13KB, and 0.6KB for
FSD, ASL, and MNIST, respectively), Fig. 16 shows the per-
sample transmission times versus the network connection data
rate. Analysis shows that, compared with the local inference,
the remote inference achieves shorter time delays when the
connection data rate is higher than 15Mbps. Note that 4G
connections normally provide more than 100Mbps data rate.
Thus, remote inference will be more advantageous in terms
of total time delay. The advantage of remote inference can be
better exhibited when the scales of the InfNets are larger or
the edge devices are not equipped with inference accelerators.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The case studies presented in this paper show that there
can exist a small-scale non-linear transform in the form of a
neural network, i.e., ObfNet O(·), such that the transformed
inference data samples are mapped to the same class labels
as the original inference data samples, where the mapping
is the InfNet I(·). Formally, ∃O(·), I(O(x)) = I(x) holds
mostly, ∀x ∈ X , where X represents the inference dataset.
The evaluation also shows that the ObfNet can well protect
the confidentiality of the raw form of the inference data
sample x, through the volunteers’ auditory examination on
the obfuscated FSD samples and the visual examination on
the obfuscated MNIST and ASL samples. Therefore, this
paper presents a lightweight and unobtrusive data obfuscation
approach for inference, which can be used to protect the edge
devices’ data privacy in the remote inference systems.
In our future work, we aim to apply the ObfNet approach for
a number of heavyweight InfNets that deal with more complex
auditory and visual sensing tasks such as full-fledged speech
recognition and DNNs for ImageNet [45].
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Fig. 17. Confusion matrix for recognizing the audio inverted from the MFCC
representations obfuscated by ObfNet OC that is trained for InfNet IM . The
matrix omits the zeros.
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APPENDIX
A. Confusion Matrices for Other Three ObfNets in FSD
Recognition
Fig. 17, Fig. 18, and Fig. 19 show the confusion matrices for
recognizing the audio inverted from the MFCC representations
obfuscated by OC trained for IM , OM trained for IC , and OM
trained for IM , respectively.
B. Obfuscation Results of ObfNet OC on MNIST
Fig. 20 shows the obfuscation results of OC on MNIST.
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Fig. 19. Confusion matrix for recognizing the audio inverted from the MFCC
representations obfuscated by ObfNet OM that is trained for InfNet IM . The
matrix omits the zeros.
(a) Original inference data
(b) Obfusaction results of OC with 8 neurons in the first dense layer
(c) Obfusaction results of OC with 16 neurons in the first dense layer
(d) bfusaction results of OC with 32 neurons in the first dense layer
(e) Obfusaction results of OC with 64 neurons in the first dense layer
(f) Obfusaction results of OC with 128 neurons in the first dense layer
(g) Obfusaction results of OC with 256 neurons in the first dense layer
(h) Obfusaction results of OC with 512 neurons in the first dense layer
Fig. 20. Obfuscation results of ObfNet OC on MNIST.
